"(a) GENERAL PRINCIPLES ( §§ 115 - 120)
115. The Court reiterates that the difference between DEPRIVATION of liberty and RESTRICTION on liberty of movement, the latter being governed by Article 2 of Protocol No.4, is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends (see GUZZARDI v. Italy, 6 November 1980, §§ 92-93, Series A no.39). In order to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see STORCK, cited above, § 71, and GUZZARDI, cited above, § 92).
116. In the context of deprivation of liberty on mental health grounds, the Court has held that a person could be regarded as having been " DETAINED " even during a period when he was in an open hospital ward with regular unescorted access to the unsecured hospital grounds and the possibility of unescorted leave outside the hospital (see ASHINGDANE v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 42, Series A no. 93).
117. Furthermore, in relation to the placement of mentally disordered persons in an institution, the Court has held that the notion of deprivation of liberty does not only comprise the objective element of a person's confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible length of time. A person can only be considered to have been deprived of his liberty if, as an additional subjective element, he has not validly consented to the confinement in question (see STORCK, cites above, § 74).
118. The Court has found that there was a deprivation of liberty in circumstances such as the following:
a) where the applicant, who had been declared legally incapable and admitted to a psychiatric hospital at his legal representative's request , had unsuccessfully attempted to leave the hospital (see SHTUKATUROV v. Russia, no. 44.009/05, § 108, 27 March 2008)
b) where the applicant had initially consented to her admission to a clinic but had subsequently attempted to escape (see STORCK, cited above, § 76) , and
c) where the applicant was an adult incapable of giving his consent to admission to a psychiatric institution which, nonetheless, he had never attempted to leave (see H.L. v. the U.K., no. 45.508/99, §§ 89 - 94, ECHR 2004 - IX).
119. The Court has also held that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given himself up to be taken into detention (see DE WILDE, OOMS and VERSYP v.Belgium, 18 June 1971, §§ 64 - 65, Series A no. 12), especially when it is not disputed that that person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action (see H.L. v. UK, cited above, § 90).
120. In addition, the Court has had occasion to observe that the first sentence of Article 5 § 1 must be construed as laying down a positive obligation on the State to protect the liberty of those within its jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be a SIZEABLE GAP in the protection from arbitrary detention, which would be inconsistent with the importance of personal liberty in a democratic society. The State is therefore obliged to take measures providing effective protection of VULNERABLE PERSONS, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought have knowledge (see STORCK, cited above, § 102). Thus, having regard to the particular circumstances of the cases before it, the Court has held that the national authorities ' responsibility was engaged as a result of detention in a psychiatric hospital at the request of the applicant's guardian (see SHTUKATUROV, cited above) and detention in a private clinic (see STORCK. cited above). "
Tatsächlich wird nun auch hier im vorgegebenen Anlaßfall von WOLFGANG S. kein einziger der Verantwortlichen freiwillig zugeben und eingestehen, daß er am 17.Oktober 2003 eine derartige " DEPRIVATION of LIBERTY " erleiden und erdulden mußte, die bis heute ununterbrochen anhält. Vielleicht hat man ihm sogar irgendwann eine mehr oder minder erzwungene "Zustimmung" abgerungen für diese erbärmlich behübschte und perfekt getarnte " Schutzhaft". Vor der GRAND CHAMBER in Straßburg jedoch werden sich alle diese Behübschungs - Exzesse mit absoluter Sicherheit total verflüchtigen und es wird zu einer einstimmigen Verurteilung von FELIX AUSTRIA kommen in gleicher Weise wie im hier dargelegten Falle von Rusi STANEV gegen Bulgaristan.
Wenngleich die gesamte Verantwortung für die konkrete Herimunterbringung ausschließlich beim Land Salzburg liegt als Aufsichtsbehörde und auch sogar als ganz konkreter Auftraggeber und Finanzierer der "Maßnahme", so liegt letztendlich doch beim B U N D die konkrete Verantwortlichkeit für die Gewährleistung des verfassungsmäßig garantierten Rechtes auf "Persönliche Freiheit". Der Bund haftet nach § 24 Heimaufenthaltsgesetz auch für jedes Fehlverhalten von Landesorganen sowie für jedes Vergehen und Verbrechen von Heimträgern im Zusammenhang mit einer solchen erbärmlichen Freiheitsberaubung in Form von "Zwangsverheimung".
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Bundesnormen/NOR40050338/NOR40050338.pdf
115. The Court reiterates that the difference between DEPRIVATION of liberty and RESTRICTION on liberty of movement, the latter being governed by Article 2 of Protocol No.4, is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends (see GUZZARDI v. Italy, 6 November 1980, §§ 92-93, Series A no.39). In order to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see STORCK, cited above, § 71, and GUZZARDI, cited above, § 92).
116. In the context of deprivation of liberty on mental health grounds, the Court has held that a person could be regarded as having been " DETAINED " even during a period when he was in an open hospital ward with regular unescorted access to the unsecured hospital grounds and the possibility of unescorted leave outside the hospital (see ASHINGDANE v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 42, Series A no. 93).
117. Furthermore, in relation to the placement of mentally disordered persons in an institution, the Court has held that the notion of deprivation of liberty does not only comprise the objective element of a person's confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible length of time. A person can only be considered to have been deprived of his liberty if, as an additional subjective element, he has not validly consented to the confinement in question (see STORCK, cites above, § 74).
118. The Court has found that there was a deprivation of liberty in circumstances such as the following:
a) where the applicant, who had been declared legally incapable and admitted to a psychiatric hospital at his legal representative's request , had unsuccessfully attempted to leave the hospital (see SHTUKATUROV v. Russia, no. 44.009/05, § 108, 27 March 2008)
b) where the applicant had initially consented to her admission to a clinic but had subsequently attempted to escape (see STORCK, cited above, § 76) , and
c) where the applicant was an adult incapable of giving his consent to admission to a psychiatric institution which, nonetheless, he had never attempted to leave (see H.L. v. the U.K., no. 45.508/99, §§ 89 - 94, ECHR 2004 - IX).
119. The Court has also held that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given himself up to be taken into detention (see DE WILDE, OOMS and VERSYP v.Belgium, 18 June 1971, §§ 64 - 65, Series A no. 12), especially when it is not disputed that that person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action (see H.L. v. UK, cited above, § 90).
120. In addition, the Court has had occasion to observe that the first sentence of Article 5 § 1 must be construed as laying down a positive obligation on the State to protect the liberty of those within its jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be a SIZEABLE GAP in the protection from arbitrary detention, which would be inconsistent with the importance of personal liberty in a democratic society. The State is therefore obliged to take measures providing effective protection of VULNERABLE PERSONS, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought have knowledge (see STORCK, cited above, § 102). Thus, having regard to the particular circumstances of the cases before it, the Court has held that the national authorities ' responsibility was engaged as a result of detention in a psychiatric hospital at the request of the applicant's guardian (see SHTUKATUROV, cited above) and detention in a private clinic (see STORCK. cited above). "
Tatsächlich wird nun auch hier im vorgegebenen Anlaßfall von WOLFGANG S. kein einziger der Verantwortlichen freiwillig zugeben und eingestehen, daß er am 17.Oktober 2003 eine derartige " DEPRIVATION of LIBERTY " erleiden und erdulden mußte, die bis heute ununterbrochen anhält. Vielleicht hat man ihm sogar irgendwann eine mehr oder minder erzwungene "Zustimmung" abgerungen für diese erbärmlich behübschte und perfekt getarnte " Schutzhaft". Vor der GRAND CHAMBER in Straßburg jedoch werden sich alle diese Behübschungs - Exzesse mit absoluter Sicherheit total verflüchtigen und es wird zu einer einstimmigen Verurteilung von FELIX AUSTRIA kommen in gleicher Weise wie im hier dargelegten Falle von Rusi STANEV gegen Bulgaristan.
Wenngleich die gesamte Verantwortung für die konkrete Herimunterbringung ausschließlich beim Land Salzburg liegt als Aufsichtsbehörde und auch sogar als ganz konkreter Auftraggeber und Finanzierer der "Maßnahme", so liegt letztendlich doch beim B U N D die konkrete Verantwortlichkeit für die Gewährleistung des verfassungsmäßig garantierten Rechtes auf "Persönliche Freiheit". Der Bund haftet nach § 24 Heimaufenthaltsgesetz auch für jedes Fehlverhalten von Landesorganen sowie für jedes Vergehen und Verbrechen von Heimträgern im Zusammenhang mit einer solchen erbärmlichen Freiheitsberaubung in Form von "Zwangsverheimung".
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Bundesnormen/NOR40050338/NOR40050338.pdf
WOLFGANG SCHON MEHR ALS 3.333 TAGE IN GEISELHAFT DER LANDESREGIERUNG SALZBURG : DER BUND HAFTET DURCH DIE FINANZPROKURATUR !
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